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IT’S “EXHAUSTING”: RECONCILING A PRISONER’S RIGHT
TO MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS WITH THE NEED FOR AGENCY AUTONOMY
Allen E. Honick*
“If we are to keep our democracy there must be one
commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice.”1
“The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by
entering its prisons.”2
INTRODUCTION
The United States imprisons more people than any other nation.3
With more than 2.4 million prisoners, the American prison
population outnumbers those of all European countries combined.4
Behind the new “iron curtain” exists a hidden world in which
conditions are abhorrent, basic human rights are unprotected, and
meaningful opportunities for redress are almost non-existent. As the
national conversation centers on the effectiveness and sustainability
of mass incarceration,5 this Comment highlights a less examined, but
equally important, aspect of the incarceration problem—the lack of
meaningful remedies for prisoners whose civil rights have been
violated. The single biggest obstacle in the way of vindicating

*

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

Allen E. Honick, Editor, Volume 45, University of Baltimore Law Review. J.D.
Candidate, 2016, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., 2013, Stevenson
University. I am grateful to Professor Colin P. Starger for his thoughtful guidance and
advice with this Comment.
Chief Judge Learned Hand, 75th Anniversary Address to the Legal Aid Society of
New York (Feb. 16, 1951).
FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD (Constance Garnett trans., 1861).
Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html.
See World Prison Populations, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/priso
ns/html/nn1page1.stm (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). China has a population nearly 10
times the size of the Unites States, yet incarcerates almost one million fewer citizens.
Id.
E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
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constitutional rights is the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),6
and the judicially imposed restrictions engrafted since its enactment.7
This Comment will address the inadequacy and injustice of the
PLRA, specifically the “proper exhaustion” rule as expressed in
Woodford v. Ngo.8 “Proper exhaustion” means that “a prisoner must
complete the administrative review process in accordance with
applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to
bringing suit in federal court.”9 Failure to adhere to even the slightest
procedural requirement is sufficient to warrant procedural default,
i.e., a dismissal regardless of the merits of the underlying claim.10
The PLRA seeks to achieve laudable ends, but the means by which it
does so leave much to be desired.
I do not present here a study of the reasons for an individual’s
incarceration, but I focus, instead, on the difficulties an incarcerated
individual faces in efforts to have a grievance decided on the merits.11
Further, rather than critique the inequities and shortcomings in the
criminal justice system as a whole, I examine the experience of life
behind bars, and suggest how constitutional rights and protections
can be guaranteed to those in prison.12 For present purposes, I
presume that those currently incarcerated are thus situated because
they committed a crime for which they were duly tried and convicted,
and are now serving a sentence imposed according to due process.
“Imprisonment” by definition means the loss of certain aspects of
liberty,13 but it is not a blanket removal of all constitutional rights.14
Prisoners retain substantive rights under the First Amendment
(freedom of speech, religion, and access to the courts),15 the Fifth and
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
See infra Part II.C.
548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). Proper exhaustion and the consequence of procedural default
differs from ordinary administrative exhaustion in that the latter only requires a
claimant to present a complaint to an administrative agency prior to filing suit with
dismissal of that claim having no bearing on future ability to file suit, whereas
procedural default dictates that if a complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with
procedural guidelines, a court can never consider that claim.
Id. at 88.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Parts I–IV.
See infra Parts I–IV.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005). Prisoners do retain nominal liberty
interests, such as the interest in avoiding solitary confinement, when that classification
“imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline.” Id. at
223.
See infra Part I.A.
See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321–22 (1972) (per curiam); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S.
546 (1964) (per curiam).
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Fourteenth Amendments (due process and equal protection),16 and the
Eighth Amendment (protection against cruel and unusual
punishment),17 to name a few. Nor is incarceration a relinquishment
of citizenship.18 Thus, the privileges guaranteed to citizens, other
than basic liberty interests, must also be ensured for prisoners.
This Comment begins, in Part I, by examining the history of
redressing constitutional violations in prison. To properly understand
the current state of affairs regarding prisoner civil rights actions, it is
necessary to first explore the institutional framework for prisoner
complaints, and the rationale behind its creation and implementation.
Part I traces the history leading up to the PLRA, and the fundamental
deficiency in the motivation and rationale offered for the PLRA’s
enactment.
Part II focuses on the specifics of the PLRA, what it requires of
prisoner litigants, and how the PLRA fundamentally altered a
prisoner’s ability to bring a constitutional claim in federal court.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is examined as developed in
the seven Supreme Court decisions since the PLRA’s enactment.19
The judicial gloss of proper exhaustion and the consequence of
procedural default articulated by the Supreme Court is the primary
inquiry.20 Procedural default, I argue, is the most significant barrier
between a prisoner with a valid claim and the federal courts.21
Part III begins by examining Justice Stevens’ dissent in Woodford,
and
its
criticism
of
the
majority’s
rationale
for
engrafting into the PLRA proper exhaustion as an absolute
requirement. Proper exhaustion creates an inherent conflict of
interests that undermines the PLRA’s intent.22 Prisoners wishing to
complain, inter alia, about their treatment by staff are required to
submit their grievances to the same officials who, often times, are
defendants in the underlying action.23 These officials then have the
incentive and the ability, based on the proper exhaustion doctrine, to
procedurally default a claim, thereby reducing the likelihood of
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93–112 (1945).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910).
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
See discussion infra Parts II.B–C.
See discussion infra Parts II.B–C.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Parts III.B–C.
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judicial intervention.24
Repealing or revising the exhaustion
provision would be the most direct and effective method to remedy
procedural default, but given the extreme difficulty this Congress
seemingly has in passing any meaningful legislation,25 other solutions
are explored.
In Part IV, two proposals are offered. The first involves a technical
analysis of the proper exhaustion doctrinal underpinning, focusing on
exceptions and loopholes built into the rule. The key to the
harmonious existence of proper exhaustion and meaningful redress
lies in exceptions to the rule. Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Woodford is explored, and the administrative law interpretative
framework discussed therein is, I argue, the appropriate guidepost for
federal courts analyzing and applying proper exhaustion under the
PLRA.26 There is precedent for recognizing exceptions to proper
exhaustion that should guide courts in their application of the
This proposal is easily
PLRA’s exhaustion provision.27
implementable and can take effect immediately.
The second proposal involves a long term and more comprehensive
policy analysis, addressing the sources of the majority of prisoner
civil rights actions, and holding prison officials accountable for
violations in their institutions.28 Given the inherently closed and
secretive nature of prisons, a better system of checks and balances is
necessary, taking into account the need for agency autonomy while
still protecting constitutional rights. Ongoing independent oversight
can provide a preemptive problem-solving function instead of the
current reactive model employed by the federal judiciary. Although
this proposal will take time, it provides a strong foundation for long
term systemic changes in the American prison model.
PART I
The federal courts’ involvement in conditions of confinement has
come full-circle. From the Great Depression through the early 1960s,

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

See infra Part III.C.
See Rebecca Kaplan, Unpopular Congress Was Also Very Unproductive in 2013,
CBSNEWS (Dec. 24, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/unpopularcongress-was-also-very-unproductive-in-2013/; Cristina Marcos, A ‘Do Nothing’
Congress?, THEHILL (July 13, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/flooraction/212041-a-do-nothing-congress.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.B.
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federal courts took a “hands-off” approach,29 and did not interfere
with conditions on the inside.30 Between 1961 and 1980, courts
began affirmatively changing the way they dealt with allegations of
constitutional violations.31 During this time, courts conferred
substantive and procedural rights on prisoners, and it seemed as
though the gates of this “shadow world” had swung open.32 Congress
also became involved in securing the judicially declared rights,
enacting legislation aimed at providing prisoners with meaningful
avenues of redress for violations of these newly recognized rights.33
Three decades of progress in prisoner rights began to unwind in 1996
when Congress enacted the PLRA.34 Nearly twenty years later,
prisoners again find themselves without adequate remedies for
violations of the most basic civil rights.35 The PLRA and its
accompanying jurisprudence have gradually eroded decades of
progress in the prisoner rights arena.36
A. “Hands Off” No More
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the classic vehicle for vindicating federal
constitutional rights, and provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . custom, or
usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). Ruffin
epitomized feelings of the federal bench toward prisoners and prison conditions,
referring to prisoners as “slave[s] of the State.” Id. “The bill of rights is a declaration
of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and
men civilly dead.” Id. This attitude resulted in a “hands off” approach by federal
courts, leaving prison conditions and prison complaints to the individual state
agencies without judicial oversight. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
See MATT DELISI & PETER JOHN CONIS, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS: THEORY,
RESEARCH, POLICY & PRACTICE 56 (2d ed. 2013).
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 562 (stating that “in recent years . . . [federal] courts largely have
discarded this ‘hands off’ attitude” to the problems inside prisons “and have waded
into this complex arena”).
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See infra Part I.B.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
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law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . .
. .37
In 1961, the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape,38 a case in
which an African-American man was arrested following a
warrantless search of his home, detained for more than ten hours
without access to counsel, and subsequently released without being
charged.39 The Court held that in passing Section 1983, Congress
intended to provide “a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his
position.”40 Section 1983 does not create a new cause of action, but
provides a method for enforcing constitutional rights elsewhere
established.41 Importantly, Section 1983 does not precondition the
right to a constitutional claim in federal court on any procedural
qualifications.42
In 1964, the Supreme Court recognized a state prisoner’s
unconditional right to bring a claim under Section 1983.43 The
rationale behind the lack of procedural barriers was that an aggrieved
prisoner should not be required to seek relief from the state
authorities against whom Section 1983 guarantees immediate judicial
access.44 This, of course, makes good sense, as in many if not most
prisoner complaints these same prison officials are defendants in the
ultimate action.45 Prisoners began filing federal claims under Section
1983 to improve their conditions of confinement, and successfully
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

42.

43.

44.
45.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–85 (1961)
(interpreting the original intent of Section 1983).
365 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 172; see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,
106 (1989) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01
(1978)) (holding that Section 1983 “provides a remedy ‘against all forms of official
violation of federally protected rights’”).
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (holding that Section 1983 is not itself a
source of substantive rights, but rather “imposes liability for violations of rights
protected by the Constitution”).
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1982). The Patsy court explicitly
noted: “[T]his Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an
action under § 1983 . . . .” Id.
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). Federal prisoners were given a
similar right to pursue constitutional claims against the federal government, since
Section 1983 pertains only to state action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390–91, 397–98 (1971).
DAVID FATHI, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2009) (citing Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516).
Id. at 12.
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secured numerous rights in a series of Supreme Court decisions
between 1969 and 1976.46 Meaningful access to the courts,47
religious freedom,48 procedural due process,49 equal protection from
invidious racial discrimination,50 and adequate medical care51 were
assured, reversing a century-old trend of federal courts remaining
uninvolved in state prison conditions.52 In 1974, the Court declared:
“There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisoners of this country.”53
Following Cooper, Section 1983 permitted prisoners to file federal
claims for any allegation of constitutional violations, but in a speech
to the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), Chief
Justice Warren Burger suggested that states implement an
institutional grievance model as a method for prisoners to raise
complaints without having to go to court:
What we need is to supplement [judicial actions] with
flexible, sensible working mechanisms adapted to the
modern conditions of overcrowded and understaffed prisons
. . . a simple and workable procedure by which every person
in confinement who has, or thinks he has, a grievance or
complaint can be heard promptly, fairly and fully.54
B. State Grievance Systems – An Early Model
In 1980, Congress followed Chief Justice Burger’s
recommendation and endorsed, inter alia, the use of administrative
prison grievance systems by passing the Civil Rights of

46.
47.

48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See cases cited infra notes 47–51.
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (“[I]t is fundamental that access of
prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be
denied or obstructed.”).
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322–23 (1972) (per curiam).
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). A unanimous Court held that a
prisoner’s pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at
520–21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (per curiam).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Speech to the National Association of Attorneys
General in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1970) (emphasis supplied).
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Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).55 The purpose of the
administrative grievance system format was to encourage settlement
of prisoner disputes as an alternative to filing suit in federal court.56
The CRIPA set forth minimum criteria for these systems, and
required that each state’s grievance model be certified by either the
U.S. Attorney General or a federal court.57 The CRIPA mandated
that administrative remedies must be “plain, speedy, and effective.”58
Exhaustion was added to the CRIPA to counterbalance other
provisions in the Act which made it significantly easier for prisoners
to file suit against prison officials.59 A prisoner only had to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a federal claim if a state system
was certified by the U.S. Attorney General or a federal court.60 The
state grievance system scheme addressed early concerns regarding a
potential flood of inmate litigation in light of the earlier Supreme
Court holdings permitting private federal causes of action for alleged
constitutional violations.61
The grievance system model was intended to provide prison
administrators with an opportunity to address institutional complaints
internally and avoid judicial intervention in the states’ operation of
their prisons.62
The CRIPA acknowledged a duality in the
administrative remedy procedure—it was both an avenue for
55.
56.

57.

58.
59.

60.
61.
62.

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat.
349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997a–j (2012)).
See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion
Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials
Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 494–96 (2001).
CRIPA § 7(a)(2). Certification requirements included an advisory role for employees
and prisoners in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the system;
maximum time limits for written replies to prisoner grievances; priority processing of
emergency grievances; safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant; and
independent review of the disposition of grievances by a person or entity not under the
direct supervision or control of the institution. Id. § 7(b)(2).
Id. § 7(b)(1).
Branham, supra note 56, at 495; see also Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons:
Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin.
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 53–54 (1977) [hereinafter
CRIPA Hearings] (statement of Rep. Drinnan) (noting a concern among state
attorneys general “that a person should be required to exhaust his administrative
remedies before the Attorney General can act”).
Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective
on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 1531 (2003).
Id. at 1530–31.
See Branham, supra note 56, at 495; see also CRIPA Hearings, supra note 59, at 77
(statement of Jay Lawrence Lichtman, Deputy Director, Defender Division, National
Legal Aid and Defender Association).
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prisoners to bring complaints, and an opportunity for prison
administrators to recognize patterns of abuse, corruption, or other
institutional shortcomings, and handle these claims internally without
judicial involvement.63 This model preserved state agency autonomy
while still providing a meaningful method of redress for prisoners
alleging constitutional violations.
One significant provision in the CRIPA required an independent
review of the disposition of grievances “by a person or other entity
not under the direct supervision or direct control of the institution.”64
Congress thus recognized the importance of an objective impartial
review of the internal adjudication of prisoner claims. The CRIPA
authorized the U.S. Attorney General to seek injunctive relief on
behalf of prisoners deprived of their legal rights.65 The CRIPA also
provided an attorney’s fee allowance: “[A] court may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee against the United
States as part of the costs.”66 This incentivized private counsel
involvement in prisoner actions, an important provision that the
PLRA eventually repealed.67
The CRIPA was primarily designed to address widespread
constitutional violations in prisons.68 While the language of the
CRIPA regarding grievance system certification seemed strong and
prisoner friendly, the federal government did little following the
CRIPA’s enactment to implement the certification requirements, and
the certified system model never caught on.69
Notably, in the few states that obtained CRIPA certification,70 the
grievance system model was successful in both resolving prisoner
complaints and reducing the volume of Section 1983 actions in
federal court.71 The administrative remedy model was put to the test,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

CRIPA Hearings, supra note 59, at 53 (statement of Melvin T. Axilbund, Staff
Director, A.B.A. Commission on Correctional Facilities).
CRIPA §7(b)(2)(E).
Id. § 5(a)(1).
Id. § 3(b).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2012).
See Branham, supra note 56, at 493–94.
Lewis v. Meyer, 815 F.2d 43, 44–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (observing that “the Attorney
General has not published a list of complying state rules[,]” making state compliance
with the certification requirement difficult if not impossible).
E.g., Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia.
See, e.g., Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners
Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935, 943–44 (1986).
Between January 1 and November 30, 1984, Virginia referred 241 federal cases to the
state’s certified grievance procedure. Id. at 943. Seventy of these cases were resolved

164

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 45

albeit on a limited scale, and withstood the challenge, proving that
“[a]n early and effective grievance procedure can without question
minimize much of the burdensome inmate litigation under Section
1983 and still provide inmates with an expeditious and fair resolution
of their often legitimate complaints.”72
In 1980, there were roughly 500,000 prisoners in the United
States.73
Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. prison population
experienced accelerated growth due to the “War on Drugs,”74
mandatory minimum sentencing,75 and recidivism (“three strikes”)
statutes.76 Interestingly, the rate at which prisoners filed civil rights
suits between 1980 and 1996 actually decreased by 17 percent,77
instead of ballooning as one might expect (or as the PLRA’s
proponents claimed) given the tremendous expansion of the prison
population.78
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act.79 The
attitude toward prison litigation had taken a decisive turn from the
socially conscious mindset of the 1970s and 1980s. The PLRA was

72.
73.

74.

75.

76.

77.
78.

79.

by the grievance procedure, and 105 cases were reconsidered by the federal courts.
Id.
Id. at 951–52.
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 3 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfile
s/pcs_assets/2010/CollateralCosts1pdf.
“War on Drugs” refers to the federal drug prohibition policies beginning with
President Richard Nixon’s passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), and further developed by the Reagan, Bush
I, and Clinton administrations. The phrase “War on Drugs” was first coined by
President Reagan in a radio speech to the American public. Reagan, in Radio Talk,
Vows Drive Against Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982
/10/03/us/no-headline-194726.html.
E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000) (setting forth mandatory minimum sentencing for
statutorily imposed limits on possession and distribution of controlled dangerous
substances).
See Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 331–34 (2005); see also Vincent Schiraldi,
Digging Out: As U.S. States Begin to Reduce Prison Use, Can America Turn the
Corner on its Imprisonment Binge?, 24 PACE L. REV. 563, 563 (2004).
See JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS, 1980–96, at iii (1997), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppfc96.pdf.
See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1585 (2003).
Schlanger notes that although the number of absolute filings increased during this
period, the filing rate per prisoner “peaked in 1981.” Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012 & Supp. I 2014).
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introduced as part of the 1994 “Contract with America,”80 and
packaged as a rider to an appropriations bill.81 Just like the War on
Drugs, the PLRA capitalized on public sentiment regarding tort
reform and other law and order goals.82 Senator Orrin Hatch, then
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced the PLRA in
1995:
This landmark legislation will help bring relief to a civil
justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
Jailhouse lawyers with little better to do are tying our courts
in knots with an endless flow of frivolous litigation.
Our legislation will also help to restore a balance to prison
conditions litigation and will ensure that Federal court
orders are limited to remedying actual violations of
prisoners’ rights, not letting prisoners out of jail. It is time
to lock the revolving prison door and to put the key safely
out of reach of overzealous Federal courts.83
The PLRA’s primary purpose was to reduce a perceived
“epidemic” of frivolous prisoner lawsuits.84 Its enactment was
premised on the belief that prisoners “were unduly litigious, making
federal cases out of the most trivial mishaps[,]” and these cases “were
deluging both executive and judicial officials who were supposed to
respond to them,” resulting in “remarkably few successes” for
prisoners.85 The CRIPA, critics argued, was too permissive in
opening the doors to the courtrooms, and had a burgeoning effect on
federal dockets.86 Proponents of the PLRA did not consider that the
growing prisoner docket was more a result of rapidly rising prison
populations than frivolous litigation.87 In fact, contrary to the
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Contract With America, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (1994), http://www.nati
onalcenter.org/ContractwithAmerica.html; H.R. 3, 104th Cong. (1995).
H.R. 2076, 104th Cong. Tit. VIII (1995).
See Roger Roots, Of Prisoners and Plaintiff’s Lawyers: A Tale of Two Litigation
Reform Efforts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 210, 210–11 (2002); see also Kenneth B.
Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs”
was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 389–91 (2002) (arguing that
President Reagan’s drug war efforts were purely political and exploited the prevailing
view toward illicit drugs in America in the 1980s).
141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The
Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1776 (2003).
Schlanger, supra note 78, at 1567.
See id. at 1566–67.
Id. at 1586–87.
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position asserted by the PLRA’s proponents, a study conducted the
year prior to the PLRA’s enactment concluded that prisoners “are no
more litigious than anyone else.”88
1.

Misplaced Reasoning and the PLRA – Anecdotal Hype

Congress failed to recognize that “[w]hat for a private citizen
would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his
tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the
prisoner, a dispute with the State.”89 The “frivolity” cited by the
PLRA’s proponents was, in large part, only frivolous to them because
they lacked an appropriate frame of reference.90 This is not to dispute
or minimize the concern of frivolous prisoner litigation. Rather, the
soaring rhetoric proclaiming an “epidemic” of frivolous prisoner suits
was based on anecdotal lobbying instead of empirical data.91
At first blush, the impetus for the PLRA seems logical and correct.
Surely it is in everyone’s best interest, including prisoners with
meritorious claims, to have the federal docket freed up to the point
that only worthy complaints are heard. In a 1995 letter to the editor
published in the New York Times, four attorneys general argued in
support of the PLRA: “Taxpayers have grown justifiably tired of
footing the bill for the special privileges provided to prisoners . . . .”92
In support of the PLRA, the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) compiled a “top ten frivolous litigation list”93 to
illustrate the need for limiting prisoners’ access to the courts.94 The
list purportedly provided an accurate snapshot of prisoner litigation,
demonstrating the overall frivolity of these suits. The list including
suits about a prisoner who “claimed he was not provided rubber
shoes when he was ordered to mop the floor[;]” a prisoner who
“claimed corrections officers were injecting the toothpaste in the
commissary with pork by-products[;]” a prisoner who sued “because
the prison’s shower water was too cold and the building itself was too
88.

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA): Myths and Facts, SAVE COALITION,
http://www.savecoalition.org/myths.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) (noting that in
1995, the rate of prisoner civil rights suits was 25 per 1000, while the rate of lawsuits
filed by the entire U.S. population in both state and federal courts was 56 per 1000).
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA): Myths and Facts, supra note 88.
Roosevelt, supra note 84, at 1777.
Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts From Frivolous Prisoner
Suits, N.Y. TIMES (March 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/03/opinion/lfree-the-courts-from-frivolous-prisoner-suits-486495.html.
See William C. Collins, Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE L. REV. 651, 667 (2004).
Id.
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drafty[;]” and the most infamous case involving a prisoner who
“sued, claiming cruel and unusual punishment because he received
one jar of chunky and one jar of creamy peanut butter after ordering
two jars of chunky from the prison canteen.”95 Congress bought into
the hype and actually cited a similar list in debates on the House
floor,96 demonstrating the belief that the NAAG list was an accurate
depiction of the majority of prisoner litigation.
Prisoner rights advocates responded by publishing their own list of
ten “non-frivolous lawsuits,”97 which described some of the most
horrific and egregious examples of prison brutality and corruption.
These suits included a case where “[d]ozens of women, some as
young as 16, [were] forced to have sex with prison guards,
maintenance workers, and a prison chaplain[;]” a case in which a
“prisoner [gave] birth on the floor of the jail without medical
assistance three hours after informing prison staff that she was in
active labor[;]” and a case involving “single person cells hous[ing]
four or five prisoners with mattresses on the floor soaked by
overflowing toilets.”98 The debate became a “war of extremes,”99
grounded on both sides in purely anecdotal evidence. When the
PLRA was introduced in the Senate, bipartisan support existed for the
legislation.100 The PLRA passed in a process that “was characterized
by haste and lack of any real debate.”101
PART II
A. The PLRA’s Requirements
The PLRA imposed many new requirements on prisoner litigants
and drastically changed the Section 1983 and CRIPA models of

95.

Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution,
43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 480 n.65 (2012); Jon O. Newman, Pro Se
Prisoner Litigation, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520–21 (1996).
96. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,045 (1995) (listing the “Top Ten Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits
Nationally”).
97. The Top Ten Non-Frivolous Lawsuits Filed by Prisoners, ACLU NAT’L PRISON
PROJECT, http://archive.acluor.org/archive/Leg_2005/pdf/Leg_2005_HB2140_top10.p
df (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
98. Id.
99. Schlanger, supra note 78, at 1569.
100. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 27042–44 (1995) (supporters of the PLRA included
Senators Bob Dole, Orrin Hatch, and Harry Reid).
101. Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the
Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1998).
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unabridged access to the federal courts for all.102 The PLRA became,
in effect, a roadblock between prisoners and the courts.103 The
PLRA’s requirements included exhaustion of administrative remedies
as a precondition to filing suit,104 limitations on prospective relief,105 a
three-strikes provision barring future filings if a prisoner has
previously filed three suits that were deemed frivolous, malicious, or
were dismissed for “fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted,”106 caps on attorney’s fees,107 exclusions of recovery for
“mental or emotional injury . . . without a prior showing of physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act[,]”108 and mandating that
even indigent prisoners pay filing fees.109 Extensive scholarship
exists discussing the intricacies of the PLRA’s provisions, and, as
such, this Comment will not address them all. This Comment instead
focuses on the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, the proper
exhaustion rule, and the procedural default consequence added by the
Supreme Court.110
Although many of the PLRA’s provisions discourage prisoner
claims, none are more profound than the exhaustion requirement.
Exhaustion was never supposed to precondition a Section 1983
action.111 Prior to the PLRA, exhaustion was only required where a
state’s grievance system was certified by the U.S. Attorney General
or by a federal court.112 Even in a CRIPA certified system,
exhaustion “was in large part discretionary.”113 Further, if the
102. See generally Schlanger, supra note 78, at 1627–33 (detailing the changes made to
procedural law by the PLRA and the effects those changes had on inmate access to
federal courts and remedies).
103. Id. at 1562 (“[T]he PLRA shut the courthouse doors to many inmates.”).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012). Prospective relief refers to “all relief other than
compensatory monetary damages,” specifically referring to injunctive relief that was
common in the form of consent decrees prior to the PLRA’s enactment. Id. §
3626(g)(7).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
110. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Exhaustion is an administrative law
construct, and applied where Congress has established an administrative agency to
handle grievances that occur under its purview. Prior to the PLRA, a Section 1983
suit was an independent federal cause of action with no relation to administrative
proceedings.
112. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
113. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002) (holding that under the CRIPA, exhaustion
could only be required if the “court believed the requirement ‘appropriate and in the
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exhaustion requirement was imposed, the CRIPA required that the
case be continued for up to ninety days in order for the prisoner to
properly exhaust the available administrative remedies.114 Since the
PLRA’s enactment there have been seven Supreme Court opinions
dealing with its provisions, four of the seven cases dealt specifically
with the exhaustion requirement.115 Each of these cases further
elucidated the exhaustion rule and ultimately added the procedural
default consequence for failure to “properly” exhaust.116
B. Exhaustion Under the PLRA
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement provides: “No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under [Section 1983] or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.”117 Exhaustion under the PLRA became
mandatory, changing the CRIPA standard and creating a significant
procedural hurdle to filing suit in federal court.118 The exhaustion
provision’s specific requirements remained unclear until a string of
Supreme Court decisions clarified the provision, ending with the
2007 decision in Jones v. Bock.119 The PLRA also changed the
CRIPA’s mandate that state prison grievance systems be “plain,
speedy, and effective” for exhaustion to even be considered as a

114.
115.

116.
117.
118.
119.

interests of justice.’”). CRIPA’s exhaustion provision is a “limited exhaustion
requirement” that is “inapplicable to prisoner suits for damages when monetary relief
was unavailable through the prison grievance system.” Id. at 254 (citing McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150–51 (1992)).
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(a)(1),
94 Stat. 349 (1980).
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies in
federal court is an affirmative defense); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (proper
exhaustion is required, and failure to properly exhaust results in procedural default);
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004) (even Section 1983 claims must be
exhausted before filing suit); Porter, 534 U.S. at 516 (all conditions of confinement
claims require exhaustion); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (there is no
futility exception to the exhaustion requirement).
Jones, 549 U.S. at 211–12; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85; Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643;
Porter, 534 U.S. at 519–20; Booth, 532 U.S. at 735.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
See Branham, supra note 56, at 497–98 (outlining the procedural hurdles imposed by
the PLRA).
549 U.S. 199. The text of the exhaustion provision left open questions regarding its
scope, application, and administration procedures, and between 1996 and 2007, the
Supreme Court dealt with each of these questions. Jones signifies the last case
interpreting the exhaustion requirement.
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requirement.120 States are now free to create grievance systems that
are complex, making compliance difficult at best.
Conceptually, the exhaustion provision seems reasonable and well
grounded. Prison administrators should be given the first opportunity
to handle a prisoner’s grievance, both for expediency and autonomy.
Given the frequency with which prisoners file suit, and that these
individuals are committed to the custody of the state in which they
were sentenced, it is entirely reasonable for state prison agencies to
have some autonomy in addressing complaints within their purview,
and for administrative exhaustion to dissuade frivolous filings.121
This autonomy, however, should not preclude meritorious claims
from reaching the federal courts. Prison grievance systems are not
zero sum situations—there must be room for both administrative
autonomy in prison management and a prisoner’s ability to bring a
constitutional claim in federal court under Section 1983. The
Supreme Court’s decisions following the PLRA’s enactment
illustrate the imbalance in favor of unchecked agency autonomy at
the expense of constitutional rights.
C. Supreme Court Interpretation of Exhaustion
1.

Booth v. Churner

In 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Booth v. Churner
to resolve a circuit split regarding the PLRA’s exhaustion
provision.122 The Court specifically addressed whether a prisoner
seeking compensatory damages in a Section 1983 action is subject to
the exhaustion requirement when the internal grievance procedure
could not provide the prisoner with the requested relief.123 In other
words, is there a futility exception to the exhaustion requirement? A
unanimous Court held that there is no such exception to the PLRA.124
In so concluding, the Court reasoned that since the PLRA removed
the requirement that a grievance system be “effective,” as originally
120. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(b)(1),
94 Stat. 349 (1980).
121. Jones, 549 U.S. at 202–03.
122. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001). The Third Circuit held that a grievance
system’s inability to provide a prisoner with the requested relief did not create an
exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289,
299–300 (3d Cir. 2000), while the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held that such an
exception was appropriate. See, e.g., Whitely v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 888 (5th Cir.
1998); Lunsford v. Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998); Garrett v. Hawk,
127 F.3d 1263, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 1997).
123. Booth, 532 U.S. at 735.
124. Id. at 740–41 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).
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provided in the CRIPA, “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly
enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative
procedures.”125 The Court thus removed traditional exhaustion
exceptions found in other areas of administrative law.126
2.

Porter v. Nussle

In 2002, the Court again addressed the PLRA’s exhaustion
provision in Porter v. Nussle.127 This case involved a prisoner
(Nussle) who filed suit alleging that he was attacked and beaten by
several prison guards.128 Rather than first pursuing the administrative
remedy procedure, Nussle filed a Section 1983 claim in federal court,
charging a violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.129 The district court dismissed Nussle’s claim for failure
to exhaust, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required
for [prisoner] claims of assault or excessive force brought under §
1983.”130 The Court of Appeals relied on the plain text of the PLRA
which requires exhaustion “with respect to prison conditions,” and
concluded that prison conditions did not include “single or
momentary matter[s], such as beatings.”131 In another unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court reversed: “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”132

125. Id. This holding not only removed the traditional futility exception to administrative
remedies, but also disregarded the need for state grievance systems to be fair and
effective, thus giving states the freedom to construct unreasonable procedural rules
without consequence.
126. Exceptions include pure questions of law in which agency actions may be challenged
without exhausting administrative remedies, futility, and unavailability of remedies.
JACOB A. STEIN, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5-49 § 49.02 (Matthew Bender & Co.,
Inc. 2014).
127. 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
128. Id. at 520.
129. Id. at 521.
130. Id. (alteration in original). This holding hearkened back to the sentiment of the
Cooper court—that a prisoner filing a Section 1983 action should not have to wrangle
procedural barriers in an attempt to have their claim heard by a judge. See supra text
accompanying notes 43–44.
131. Porter, 534 U.S. at 521–22 (alteration in original) (emphasis supplied) (citation
omitted).
132. Id. at 532.
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Woodford v. Ngo

Booth and Porter confirmed exhaustion as a universal requirement
and as a prerequisite to a federal claim, thus setting the stage for the
next major PLRA battle—what are the consequences a prisoner faces
for failure to exhaust? In 2006, the Court decided Woodford v.
Ngo,133 the case that ultimately answered this question. Ngo, a
California prisoner, filed a grievance beyond the fifteen-day period
set forth in the California regulation,134 and, as a result, his grievance
was dismissed.135 The dismissal was based purely on Ngo’s failure to
comply with the procedural filing period and was not a decision on
the merits of his claim.136 Ngo appealed the procedural dismissal,
and the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure
to exhaust.137 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to read a
procedural default requirement into the PLRA’s exhaustion provision
and reversed, holding that Ngo had indeed exhausted his
administrative remedies because “no such remedies remained
available to him.”138 The appellate court found support for its holding
in the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, which prohibits a federal
claim “until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”139 The Ninth Circuit also held that a denial on state

133. 548 U.S. 81, 83–84 (2006).
134. Id. at 86–87. The California regulation in question only provided appeal rights to a
claim that was not rejected on procedural grounds. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §
3084.5(c) (2004). Under this regulation, a prisoner had to navigate four levels of
administrative grievances and appeals before exhausting all administrative remedies.
Id.
135. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87.
136. Id.
137. Id. The district court reasoned that since Ngo failed to reach the final stage in the
administrative scheme, he had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as
required by the PLRA. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d,
548 U.S. 81 (2006).
138. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87. Since the regulatory deadline had passed, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that no administrative remedy was available to Ngo. On the issue of
procedural default, the appellate court concluded: “Procedural default is not an
inextricable element of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. If it were, prisoners’
access to courts would be based on their ability to navigate procedural minefields, not
on whether their claims had any merit.” Ngo, 403 F.3d at 631.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012 & Supp. I 2014) (emphasis supplied). This holding was
consistent with the Sixth Circuit, see Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720 (6th Cir.
2003), but conflicted with four other Courts of Appeals. See Johnson v. Meadows,
418 F.3d 1152, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005); Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181,
1182 (10th Cir. 2004); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004); Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023–24 (7th Cir. 2002).
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procedural grounds does not preclude subsequent judicial review of
the underlying claim.140
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.141 Writing for
the majority, Justice Alito concluded: “[T]he PLRA exhaustion
requirement requires proper exhaustion.”142
Proper exhaustion
demands that a non-exhausted claim can be procedurally dismissed
without a ruling on the merits.143 In so concluding, the majority noted
that “[e]xhaustion is an important doctrine in both administrative and
habeas law,” and thus borrowed from both bodies of law in its
interpretation.144 Administrative law predicates “judicial relief” on
the exhaustion of the “prescribed administrative remedy[.]”145
Administrative law demands proper exhaustion; that is, “using all
steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the
agency addresses the issue on the merits).”146 Habeas law also
requires a prisoner to exhaust state remedies before filing a petition in
federal court.147 A prisoner satisfies habeas exhaustion, however,
once state remedies “are no longer available, regardless of the reason
for their unavailability.”148
The Court also interpreted the “general scheme” of the PLRA, as
attempting to both reduce the quantity and improve the quality of
prisoner suits, and to remove federal court oversight and interference
with prison administration.149
The Court held that a proper
exhaustion requirement “serves all of these goals.”150 “The benefits
of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is
given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance.”151 The Court
ignored the other side of this coin—a fair opportunity for the
grievance to be heard. Further, the Court extended the proper
140. Ngo, 403 F.3d at 631.
141. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 82, 87. The decision was 5–1–3, with Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, in the majority, Justice Breyer
concurring, and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissenting.
142. Id. at 93.
143. Id. at 81.
144. Id. at 88.
145. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938)).
146. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). Interestingly, the Court
implies that proper exhaustion means that the agency addresses the issue on the
merits, and not by summarily dismissing claims on solely procedural grounds. Id.
147. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92.
148. Id. at 92–93.
149. Id. at 93–94.
150. Id. at 94.
151. Id. at 95 (emphasis supplied).
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exhaustion rule beyond time deadlines to all state procedural rules,
and defined the requirement as follows: “[A] prisoner must complete
the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable
procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing
suit in federal court.”152 This additional requirement significantly
enhanced the exhaustion provision of the PLRA, mandating that a
court dismiss a claim, not only if it was untimely under state
regulations, but also if it failed to comply with even the most minute
procedural directive.153 Woodford is the most significant decision
since the PLRA’s enactment because of the addition of proper
exhaustion and the consequence of procedural default.154
Woodford was not the right case to determine the consequence for
failure to exhaust. The plaintiff failed to comply with the regulatory
guidelines not because of some exigency, but because of neglect.155
It was this neglect upon which the majority premised its strongest
reasoning, holding that if they accepted Ngo’s argument, “a prisoner
wishing to bypass available administrative remedies could simply file
a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file on
time[,]” thus thwarting the administrative process entirely.156 This
rationale makes good sense. A more appropriate case to challenge
the exhaustion requirement would have been a defaulted claim due to
an inability to file within the regulatory time period,157 or a defaulted
claim as a result of an overly complex and difficult to follow
grievance model. Nevertheless, Woodford is the case that ultimately
decided the full scope of PLRA exhaustion and the consequences for
failure to exhaust.
4.

Jones v. Bock

In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Bock,158 the last
opinion dealing with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. This case
dealt with challenges to the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of heightened
pleading standards, which were “designed to implement the
exhaustion requirement and facilitate early judicial screening.”159
The Sixth Circuit interpreted the PLRA’s exhaustion provision as
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 88.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.A.
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 86–87.
Id. at 95.
E.g., Minix v. Pazera, No. 3:06-CV-398RM, 2007 WL 4233455 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 28,
2007).
158. 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
159. Id. at 202–03.
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requiring a prisoner to plead exhaustion as an element of the
complaint, to name all defendants who might later be sued, and to
exhaust each claim in the complaint separately.160 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.161 In a unanimous
decision, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “failure to exhaust is
an affirmative defense under the PLRA[;]”162 “exhaustion is not per
se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named
in the grievances[;]”163 and that requiring a prisoner to exhaust each
claim asserted in a complaint “certainly [does] not comport with the
purpose of the PLRA to reduce the quantity of inmate suits.”164
Although the Court struck down these heightened pleading
requirements, its rationale was not based on the standards being too
complex or prejudicial to prisoner litigants, as the standards would
have been judicially enforced had they been set forth as part of the
prison grievance procedure.165 The Jones Court thus reaffirmed a
policy of deferral to prison administrators in rulemaking, regardless
of how difficult or prejudicial those rules may be.166
PART III
A. The Stevens Dissent in Woodford
Justice Stevens wrote a trenchant dissent in Woodford, arguing that
the majority’s interpretation of the exhaustion requirement was
wrong because it ignored the plain text of the PLRA,167 it was based
on flawed reasoning,168 and it misconstrued precedent regarding
administrative exhaustion.169 Stevens further emphasized that the
purposes of the PLRA—to reduce frivolity and improve the quality of

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Jones v. Bock, 135 F. App’x. 837, 839 (6th Cir. 2005).
Jones, 549 U.S. at 199.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 218–19.
See id. at 218.
Woodford, 548 U.S. 81, 105–07 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he text of the
PLRA does not impose a sanction of waiver or procedural default upon those
prisoners who make such procedural errors.”).
168. Id. at 107–15 (asserting that the majority’s application of “extratextual waiver
sanctions” to a de novo proceeding under Section 1983 was “seriously misguided”).
169. Id. at 111–13 (noting the majority’s “misapprehension” of precedent by “engrafting a
procedural default rule into the PLRA”).
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prisoner suits—would be served “even if the Court did not engraft a
procedural default sanction into the statute.”170
The majority, argued Stevens, incorrectly applied principles of
administrative law to the PLRA. Administrative exhaustion is an
appellate concept prohibiting a reviewing court from “consider[ing]
arguments not properly raised before the agency.”171 Section 1983
actions are unlike administrative agency appeals in that they are not
filed “to obtain direct review” of the grievance procedure, rather they
seek to “obtain redress for an alleged violation of federal law
committed by state corrections officials.”172 “[P]risoners who bring
[Section 1983] actions . . . are entitled to de novo proceedings in the
federal district court without any deference (on issues of law or fact)
to any ruling in the administrative grievance proceedings.”173
Administrative law principles are therefore inapplicable to prisoner
civil rights actions.174
Habeas law, Stevens contended, was also incorrectly applied to the
PLRA, citing “no fewer than six cases” in which the Supreme Court
“stated explicitly” that a habeas petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement “so long as state-court remedies are no longer available
to him at the time of the federal-court filing, regardless of the reason
for their unavailability.”175 Thus, there is no procedural default
consequence in the habeas statute.176
One of Stevens’ strongest arguments lies in his critique of the
majority’s reasoning that procedural default achieves the goals of the
PLRA.177 Stevens noted that in addition to reducing frivolous claims,
the PLRA, as explained by various Senators during floor debates, was
also designed to “preserv[e] prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious
claims[.]”178 The addition of proper exhaustion and procedural
default, Stevens argued, “bars litigation at random, irrespective of
whether a claim is meritorious or frivolous.”179 Reducing the
quantity and filing rates of prisoner litigation had already been
achieved prior to Pozo v. McCaughtry,180 the first appellate decision
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 113.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 109.
See id. at 108 (“[T]he exhaustion requirement in the federal habeas statute does not
incorporate a procedural default sanction.”).
Id. at 114–20.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117–18.
286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).
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interpreting a procedural exhaustion requirement into the PLRA.181
Stevens surmised that the reduction in claims resulted from the
ordinary exhaustion requirement in the plain text of the statute,182
thus undermining the majority’s contention that, without proper
exhaustion, the provision would be turned “into a largely useless
appendage.”183 This reduction can also be attributed to other
provisions in the PLRA, like the requirement that even indigent
prisoners filing in forma pauperis pay all filing fees.184
Finally, Stevens pointed out that “[o]rdinary exhaustion also
improves the quality of prisoner suits[,]” because it gives prison
administrators the opportunity to address a grievance on the merits
and creates an administrative record that is helpful once a suit is
filed.185 Justice Stevens noted that rather than imposing a procedural
default “punishment . . . federal courts could simply exercise their
discretion to dismiss [frivolous or non-exhausted] suits[.]”186
B. Administrative Grievance Procedures – The Inherent Conflict
Under the current model, a prisoner must submit his or her initial
grievance to the same officials who create the procedural scheme,
and who are often named defendants in the underlying action.187 This
reality creates an inherent conflict of interest in the current
administrative remedy system. A complaining prisoner is usually
grieving about treatment by prison officials, using the rules
promulgated and enforced by those same personnel.188 Although the
Supreme Court believes that prison administrators “have a reason for
creating and retaining grievance systems that provide—and that are
perceived by prisoners as providing—a meaningful opportunity for
prisoners to raise meritorious grievances[,]”189 the Court fails to
consider that those same officials have a self-serving interest in
181. Woodford, 538 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to statistics
in the Petitioner’s Brief noting that both the number and rate of filings decreased by
nearly 50% between 1995 and 2000. Id. at 115–16 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 21–
22, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05–416), 2005 WL 3598180).
182. Id. at 116.
183. Id. at 93 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 94 n.4.
185. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Ordinary exhaustion also provides prison officials
with an incentive to resolve the grievance internally, rather than opening the door for
judicial intervention. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 732 (6th Cir. 2003).
186. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
188. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 102 (majority opinion).
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preventing the most meritorious claims from ever seeing the light of
day. In fact, the Court dismisses such a contention as speculative.190
In so doing, the Court seemingly reverts to the “hands off”
rationale,191 giving prison administrators the power to procedurally
bar a grievance from reaching a federal court, thus abridging federal
jurisdiction.
This conflict is embodied in many cases, too numerous to list in
full. In Sanders v. Bachus,192 for example, a prisoner’s assault claim
was dismissed for non-exhaustion when the prisoner did not first
present the grievance to the officer who allegedly assaulted him.193 In
Snyder v. Whittier,194 a prisoner’s assault and excessive force claim
was dismissed for failure to exhaust, even though the prisoner
“testified that he was fearful of filing a grievance” with the assaulting
officer out of concern for retaliation by that guard.195
Interestingly, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent conflict of
interests in other prisoner contexts, yet seemingly ignored this
recognition when interpreting the PLRA. Disciplinary hearing
officers, observed the Court, “are under obvious pressure to resolve a
disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and their fellow
employee.”196 This “relationship between the keeper and the kept” is
hardly “conducive to a truly adjudicatory performance.”197
“[D]isciplinary boards, composed of correctional officials, may be
overly inclined to accept the word of prison guards” over a
prisoner.198 The same officials who comprise disciplinary review
boards are the ones responsible for handling prisoner grievances.199
The syllogism is clear: if a disciplinary official is “under obvious
pressure” to find in favor of the institution, surely an official who is
the subject of a complaint has a similar incentive to dismiss that
claim without reaching its merits. Allowing these officials to dispose
of a constitutional claim for procedural reasons undermines a
prisoner’s constitutional right to have the claim adjudicated on the
merits. This conflict of interests promotes a competing purpose—
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
No. 1:07-cv-360, 2008 WL 5422857 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2008).
Id. at *5.
428 F. App’x. 89 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 91.
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985).
Id.
Ponte v. Real 471 U.S. 491, 513 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the
“integral” right of a prisoner to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing).
199. See id.
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rather than encouraging accountability, such a system incentivizes
prison officials “to immunize themselves from future liability.”200
Also problematic is the absence of any exceptions to the proper
exhaustion requirement.201 The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust
“such administrative remedies as are available.”202 “Availab[ility]”
is presumed, unless a system “lacks authority to provide any relief or
take any action whatsoever in response to a complaint.”203 Equally
troubling is that many courts have dismissed claims for nonexhaustion even where good cause existed for the noncompliance.
These cases include a prisoner who was hospitalized outside the
institution until after the filing period passed,204 brain injury,205
illiteracy,206 a prisoner in solitary confinement without access to the
necessary forms,207 and a prisoner’s inability to read English.208
Further, courts have refused to recognize an emergency exception to
the exhaustion requirement.209 The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
was never meant to be so absolute.
C. The Consequences of Proper Exhaustion and Procedural Default
Supporters of the PLRA emphasized that the legislation was not
designed “to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims,”210 and
that the “reasonable requirements [of the PLRA] will not impede
meritorious claims by inmates.”211 These assertions, however, do not

200. Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 139, 151 (2007).
201. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. The exception doctrine is further
examined in Part IV.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012 & Supp. I 2014) (emphasis supplied).
203. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736 (2001) (emphasis supplied).
204. Steele v. N.Y State Dept. of Corr. Servs., No. 99 Civ 6111(LAK), 2000 WL 777931,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2000).
205. Williams v. Kennedy, No. C.A. C-05-411, 2006 WL 18314, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4,
2006).
206. Ramos v. Smith, 187 F. App’x. 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2006).
207. Green v. McBride, No. 5:04-cv-01181, 2007 WL 2815444, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Sept.
25, 2007).
208. Benavidez v. Stansberry, No. 4:07CV03334, 2008 WL 42779559, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 12, 2008).
209. See, e.g., Sanders v. Norris, No. 5:08CV00049 JTR, 2008 WL 2926198, at *2 n.8
(E.D. Ark. July 24, 2008) (“Recognizing an exception for ‘urgent medical needs’
would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirement . . . .”).
210. 141 CONG. REC. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
211. 141 CONG. REC. H1480 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady).
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correspond with the realities following the PLRA’s enactment.
Proper exhaustion is the biggest reason why.
Proper exhaustion has most succeeded in barring claims by
inexperienced prisoner litigants. “Frequent filers”212—those who file
mostly frivolous lawsuits with impunity—are seasoned professionals
in navigating prison grievance system requirements, and are not
deterred by proper exhaustion. They know precisely what is required
to properly exhaust administrative remedies simply because they
have done so with great regularity. Proper exhaustion impacts the
first-time filer who, until suffering some constitutional deprivation,
has never encountered the prison grievance system.213 It is precisely
this prisoner who most needs judicial access. Yet proper exhaustion
and the lack of meaningful independent oversight prevents this from
occurring.
Since Woodford, thousands of cases have been dismissed for failure
to properly exhaust. Some notable examples include a prisoner
(Asberry) who was attacked by fellow inmates after guards allowed
the attackers into Asberry’s cell, was left unconscious and without
medical attention for 12 hours, remained in a coma for many days
following the attack and hospitalized for several months thereafter,
and suffered permanent injuries including paralysis.214 Asberry filed
a grievance against the officers involved, but the complaint was
dismissed for failure to properly exhaust because Asberry appealed
the initial agency dismissal too soon.215 In Simpson v. Jones,216 a
prisoner filed a grievance alleging retaliatory treatment by prison
officials for filing earlier complaints.217 The grievance was dismissed
for failure to properly exhaust because the prisoner “used red ink.”218
In Whitener v. Buss,219 a prisoner filed a grievance alleging Eighth
Amendment violations after being placed in a cell with a defective
ceiling that collapsed on him causing significant injuries.220 The
court dismissed the claim for failure to properly exhaust because the
initial grievance was filed after the 48 hour filing deadline, even
212. This term is used to describe prisoners who “file not only a very large number of
cases, but an especially high proportion of meritless cases.” Schlanger, supra note 78,
at 1648.
213. Id. at 1653–54.
214. Asberry v. Okla. Dep’t. of Corr., No. CIV-08-214-JHP, 2009 WL 152536, at *1 (E.D.
Okla. Jan. 21, 2009).
215. Id. at *3.
216. 316 F. App’x. 807 (10th Cir. 2009).
217. Id. at 808.
218. Id. at 810.
219. 268 F. App’x. 477 (7th Cir. 2008).
220. Id. at 478.
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though the prisoner was required to include the officers’ names in the
complaint, and could not obtain them for two weeks after the
incident.221 These cases represent a minute sampling of Woodford’s
detrimental effects on prisoner litigation.
Proper exhaustion and the consequence of procedural default is
especially troubling because, as Justice Stevens pointed out, it bars
claims at random regardless of the merits.222 Congress surely did not
intend on authorizing arbitrary and haphazard dismissals when it
enacted the PLRA.223 PLRA proponents confidently proclaimed:
“This legislation will not prevent [legitimate] claims from being
raised,”224 and noted that a reduction in frivolous suits “will free up
judicial resources for claims with merit.”225 Proper exhaustion,
however, has nothing to do with the resolution of a meritorious claim:
“It requires dismissal of the case—regardless of its merit—if the
prisoner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements.”226
The judicial gloss of proper exhaustion has undermined the stated
Congressional intent. The chairman of the National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission recognized that exhaustion under the PLRA
“frustrate[s] Congress’s goal of eliminating sexual abuse in US
prisons, jails, and detention centers.”227 The PLRA was designed not
only to reduce the frivolity of prisoner suits, but also to improve the
quality of these claims.228 It was not designed to indiscriminately
dismiss meritorious claims solely on procedural grounds.
The reason that proper exhaustion poses such a formidable
challenge is two-fold. First, and contrary to the Woodford majority’s
belief that compliance with administrative requirements is easy,229
administrative procedures impose very short deadlines for filing an

221. Id. at 478–79.
222. See supra Part III.A.
223. Senator Hatch was clear: “I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate
claims.” 141 CONG. REC. at 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
224. 141 CONG. REC. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
225. 141 CONG. REC. S19,114 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
226. FATHI, supra note 44, at 17.
227. Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Chairman, Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n, to
Representatives Bobby Scott and Randy Forbes (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.savecoalit
ion.org/pdfs/PREA_letter_urging_reform_PLRA.pdf.
228. Id.
229. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 80, 103 (2006) (noting the “informality and relative
simplicity of prison grievance systems”).

182

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 45

initial grievance.230 Most states require that the grievance be filed
“within 14 to 30 days of the action being challenged.”231 This
effectively shortens what would otherwise be at least a one-year
statute of limitations to a matter of days.232 Procedural default
ensures that failure to file within this abbreviated limitations period
forever bars the claim,233 because by the time a federal court reviews
administrative compliance, the filing deadlines will have long since
passed.234 In addition to the timing aspects, filing a grievance on the
incorrect form,235 failing to correctly label a grievance,236 and sending
the right form to the wrong official,237 also result in procedural
dismissal. If a prisoner makes even the slightest mistake in
procedural compliance, a judge cannot consider the merits of the
underlying claim. This problem is exacerbated because courts will
generally defer to the agency’s determination of whether exhaustion
was, in fact, proper.
Second, and more troubling, grievance systems are designed by the
same officials who, often times, are defendants in the ultimate
action.238 Prisoners must submit their claim to the very officials who
have a marked interest in dismissing the grievance on procedural
grounds, thereby diminishing the chance for judicial review.239 Such
230. Brief for the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization for the Yale Law School
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 6, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81
(2006) (No. 05–416), 2006 WL 304573.
231. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 29, Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05–416), 2005 WL 3597818.
232. FATHI, supra note 44, at 13; see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 118 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n nine states [filing deadlines] are between 2 and 5 days.”).
233. E.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (majority opinion) (holding Ngo’s failure to meet the
15-day regulatory deadline as a bar to filing his claim).
234. See, e.g., Regan v. Frank, Civ. No. 06-00066 JMS-LEK, 2007 WL 10637, at *5 (D.
Haw. Jan. 9, 2007) (“Even though [the lower court] dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
without prejudice to the filing of a new action following proper exhaustion, Ngo
makes proper exhaustion of these claims impossible.”). Under the CRIPA, such a
failure would have resulted in a stay for up to 180 days to allow the prisoner time to
exhaust “plain, speedy, and effecting administrative remedies[.]” See supra note 58
and accompanying text.
235. Roscoe v. Dobson, 248 F. App’x. 440, 441 (3d Cir. 2007).
236. Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing for nonexhaustion a claim labeled “administrative appeal” instead of “disciplinary appeal”).
237. Keys v. Craig, 160 F. App’x. 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2005).
238. See FATHI, supra note 44, at 12.
239. Since procedural dismissal essentially eliminates the possibility of judicial review
regardless of the claim’s merits, prison officials can basically absolve themselves
from the possibility of an adverse judgment. A defendant must fail to raise nonexhaustion as an affirmative defense in order to have a federal court review a
procedurally defaulted claim. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
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a dismissal precludes a prisoner from filing an action in federal court,
so prison officials have a perverse incentive to procedurally default
the most serious claims. Exhaustion thus encourages prison
administrators to implement “high procedural hurdles” and never
reach the merits of a grievance “to best preserve a defense of nonexhaustion.”240 Although the Supreme Court scoffed at such a
possibility,241 there is significant evidence that states have created
procedural requirements “that cannot be understood as anything but
attempts at blocking lawsuits.”242
Proper exhaustion, however, is not fatally flawed in the context of
prisoner litigation. A middle ground exists between the need for
reducing frivolity and increasing quality and providing prisoners with
meritorious complaints a fair, meaningful, and effective avenue for
redress. Proper exhaustion can, in fact, coexist with affording
meaningful avenues of redress.
Regarding the first challenge, little can be accomplished in a
uniform way. American prisons, after all, are not governed by a
single governing entity or agency, but rather are products of their
distinct jurisdictions, each with varying procedures.243 Fundamental
principles of state’s rights and agency autonomy create formidable
obstacles in the way of federal regulations. Coupled with the
Supreme Court’s unwavering deference to state administrative
rulemaking authority, absent Congressional intervention and
amendment of the PLRA, standardizing individual agency procedural
guidelines is likely unachievable.
The second challenge, however, lends itself to universal reform.
Since fundamental due process rights are implicated by dispositive
decisions (i.e. dismissal), standards can be promulgated to allay the
inherent conflict of interests. The deference concerns arising from
agency autonomy in creating their own rules are overshadowed by
the abridgment of constitutional due process rights.

240. Schlanger & Shay, supra note 200, at 150.
241. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006) (“We are confident that the PLRA did
not create such a toothless scheme.”).
242. Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution,
43 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 469, 473 (2012).
243. FAY STENDER & RONALD M. SINOWAY, Prisoners’ Rights Litigation, 22 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 1, § 8 Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2015).
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PART IV
A. Exceptions to Proper Exhaustion – A Workable Solution
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in Woodford, in which
he agreed with the majority that “Congress intended the term
‘exhausted’ to mean what the term means in administrative law,
where exhaustion means proper exhaustion,”244 but that proper
exhaustion under the PLRA is “not absolute.”245 Justice Breyer’s
concurrence should be given greater consideration in the
implementation of the exhaustion doctrine because Breyer is “a major
voice in modern administrative law,”246 having authored an important
treatise on the subject.247 Focusing on the administrative law source
of “exhaustion,” Breyer noted “well-established exceptions” to this
doctrine.248 Pointing to two circuits that adopted this interpretation of
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, Breyer posited that courts
hearing prisoner cases should “consider any challenges” a prisoner
may have regarding a “traditional [administrative] exception that the
statute implicitly incorporates.”249
Breyer’s concurrence is a roadmap for the coexistence of proper
exhaustion and meaningful redress for prisoners. This approach
appropriately balances the need for agency autonomy in identifying
and resolving internal problems with a prisoner’s ability to seek an
effective remedy (for a constitutional violation).250
Although
Breyer’s opinion seemingly contradicts the earlier holding in Booth
regarding administrative exceptions,251 courts have recognized similar
exceptions to the PLRA itself beyond the realm of administrative law
principles.252
244. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Breyer
noted: “Congress [could not have] desired a system in which prisoners could elect to
bypass prison grievance systems without consequences.” Id.
245. Id. at 104.
246. Thomas O. Sargentich, Symposium: Justice Stephen Breyer’s Contribution to
Administrative Law, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 713, 720 (1995).
247. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES (6th ed. 2006).
248. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 104.
250. Id. at 103–04.
251. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 735; supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (asserting that prison
officials may be estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense
where they “inhibit an inmate’s ability to utilize grievance procedures”); Ziemba v.
Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he affirmative defense of exhaustion
is subject to estoppel.”); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 n.2 (5th Cir.
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The Hemphill Framework – A Suitable Alternative

In Hemphill v. New York,253 the Second Circuit established a threepart test to determine whether a prisoner, in responding to the
affirmative defense of non-exhaustion, is excused from properly
exhausting administrative remedies:
(1) were administrative
remedies “in fact ‘available’ to the prisoner[?;]” (2) did the
defendants forfeit “the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by
failing to raise it . . . or whether the defendants’ own actions
inhibiting the inmate’s exhaustion of remedies” estop them from
raising non-exhaustion; and (3) “whether ‘special circumstances’
have been plausibly alleged that justify ‘the prisoner’s’”
noncompliance.254
Whether remedies were “available” is an
objective test: “[W]ould ‘a similarly situated individual of ordinary
firmness’ have deemed them available.”255
The Hemphill test is akin to Justice Breyer’s theory that proper
exhaustion “is not absolute,”256 and creates a fact-driven analysis
considering factors beyond the prisoner’s control which may result in
the “unavailability” of administrative remedies. Other circuits have
applied Hemphill since Woodford’s proper exhaustion rule,
recognizing “special circumstances” that excuse reasonable mistakes
and still allow a claim to proceed.257 This approach virtually removes
any incentive for prison officials to construct difficult procedural
barriers, or to dismiss a claim solely on procedural grounds, because

253.
254.

255.
256.
257.

2001) (noting that PLRA exhaustion “may be subject to certain defenses such as
waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling”). See also Moore v. Bennett, 517 F.3d 717, 725
(4th Cir. 2008); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 686 (citations omitted). Although Hemphill was decided prior to Woodford,
recent decisions have relied on these factors finding that in light of Woodford, an
exception to proper exhaustion “applies in situations such as those identified in
Hemphill . . . where, for example, administrative remedies are not ‘available’ to the
prisoner at the time of the grievable incident or where prison authorities actively
interfere with an inmate’s ability to invoke such remedies.” Collins v. Goord, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 399, 411 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688.
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Moore v. Bennett, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n administrative
remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his
own, was prevented from availing himself of it.”); Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804,
809 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not
respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to
prevent a prisoner from exhausting.”). See also Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249,
1253 (10th Cir. 2011); Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085–86 (11th Cir. 2008);
Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2006).
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the claim can still be considered by a federal court. The Hemphill
test is one way to reconcile the competing interests of proper
exhaustion and protecting constitutional rights without requiring an
amendment or repeal of the PLRA.
Judges should exercise discretion when considering the affirmative
defense of non-exhaustion, and should grant a stay pending proper
exhaustion as was once permitted under the CRIPA.258 Although the
PLRA changed the CRIPA exhaustion standards,259 it does not
prohibit such equitable relief.260 This judicial discretion should work
in tandem with the other “well established” exceptions to
administrative exhaustion.
B. Oversight, Accountability, and Transparency – A Long Term
Approach
Even in the absence of the PLRA, or if certain problematic
provisions therein were repealed or amended, judicial intervention is
not the most effective method of prison oversight.261 Court
involvement generally means that a depravation has already
occurred.262 The Constitution as the basis for judicial intervention
sets a very low bar.263 A constitutional baseline is not necessarily
adequate when ensuring human rights. Ongoing independent
258. See supra Part I.B.
259. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Cruz v. Jordan, 80 F. Supp. 2d 109, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“There is no
evidence that Congress intended [in changing the CRIPA exhaustion standard] to
eliminate the district court’s equitable jurisdiction in aid of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”). Although Congress removed the stay provision set forth in the
CRIPA “does not mean that Congress intended to eliminate equitable stays where the
interest of justice require a stay rather than a dismissal.” Id.
261. See Michael M. O’Hear, Not So Sweet: Questions Raised by Sixteen Years of the
PLRA and AEDPA, 24 FED. SENT. R. 223, 226 (2012); see also David C. Fathi, The
Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1460 (2010) (“Judicial
intervention . . . will always be ad hoc and haphazard . . . .”).
262. Especially since the PLRA restricts a prisoner’s ability to petition a court for relief
until all administrative remedies are properly exhausted. O’Hear, supra note 261, at
223.
263. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (failure to protect claim requires
that prison officials know of and be deliberately indifferent to the risk); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976) (medical malpractice requires a showing of
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107,
112 (2d Cir. 1999) (constitutional right to privacy in medical information is only
violated by the “gratuitous disclosure” of that info for reasons not related to legitimate
penological concerns); Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“should have known” is not enough to prove deliberate indifference, the standard is
“must have known”).
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oversight, however, can prevent conditions from reaching the
necessity of judicial intervention.264 Federal courts should remain the
ultimate enforcers of prisoner civil rights, but a better model exists
for preemptively thwarting such violations.
At a time when such heightened concern is placed on the humane
treatment of foreign detainees,265 the same scrutiny should be applied
to American citizens incarcerated in American prisons.266 A crucial
component of meaningful oversight is ongoing supervision.
“Mission accomplished” is not an appropriate declaration in the
context of prison reform. It is too naïve to believe that, even where a
court order has been imposed, prison officials will implement the
ordered changes over the long term.267 The out of sight sphere in
which prisons exist necessitate independent oversight to effect
meaningful change over time. We do not allow public hospitals to
self-monitor, so why should prisons be different? Since prison
officials only answer to their governing agencies, and those agencies
are rarely subjected to judicial oversight as a result of the PLRA,
independent oversight is essential. This need is enhanced by the
PLRA’s limitation on injunctive relief, requiring a court to terminate

264. See Fathi, supra note 261, at 1460.
265. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2014),
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/findings-andconclusions.pdf; see also Scott Shane, U.S. Engaged in Torture After 9/11, Review
Concludes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/u
s-practiced-torture-after-9-11-nonpartisan-reviewconcludes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
266. Foreign detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, for example, were guaranteed meaningful
habeas corpus review by federal civilian judges. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
798 (2008).
267. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1930–32 (2011) (highlighting California
prison system’s failure to comply with court-ordered injunctive relief and failure to
remedy after twelve years). Earlier in the Plata litigation and after years of
California’s failure to comply with court orders, the District Court for the Northern
District of California appointed a receiver to oversee the development and
implementation of a “sustainable system” providing “constitutionally adequate
medical care” to prisoners in that state. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (Order Appointing Receiver). See also Ruiz v. Estelle, 503
F. Supp. 1265, 1389 (S.D. Tex. 1980), in which the federal court appointed special
masters to oversee the “elimination of the unconstitutional conditions found to exist in
the Texas prison system,” after the Texas Department of Corrections’ “record of
intransigence toward previous court orders” requiring changes to these deplorable
conditions.
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an order unless there is a finding of “current or ongoing”
constitutional violations.268
Another way to balance agency autonomy with ensuring
constitutional rights is through periodic and random monitoring by an
independent body. The United States has more prisoners than all of
Europe,269 yet no independent entity exists to oversee and monitor
prison conditions.270 Europe, by contrast, has a robust monitoring
system that functions independent of state governments and ensures
prisoner rights.271
In Great Britain, for example, the Ministry of Justice oversees an
independent administrative body known as Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP).272 HMIP’s mandate is to “provide
independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of
prisoners,” working to promote “the concept of ‘healthy
establishments’ in which staff work effectively to support prisoners”
in all places of detention in Great Britain.273 Inspectors conduct
routine and unannounced inspections, issue reports on the conditions
of the facilities, and make recommendations.274 HMIP promulgated
detailed criteria for conducting these inspections known as
“expectations.”275 The Expectations are “based on international
human rights standards” and “issues considered essential to the safe,
The
respectful, and purposeful treatment” of prisoners.276
Expectations also consider the “rules, regulations and guidelines”
governing each facility.277 The reports are published and prison
268. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1) (2012).
269. World Prison Populations, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/h
tml/nn1page1.stm (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
270. See Mike Tartaglia, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1692–93
(2014).
271. See generally Silvia Casale, Mechanisms for Custodial Oversight: The United States
and Europe, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 217 (2006) (discussing European oversight
mechanisms, their development and evolution, and what the Unites States can learn
from these procedures).
272. About HMI Prisons, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, http://www.justiceinspectorates.g
ov.uk/hmiprisons/about-hmi-prisons/#.VOIJZ53F98F (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
273. Id.
274. John J. Gibbons & Nicole de B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement, A Report of
the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons 80 (June 2006),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Confronting_Confinemen
t.pdf.
275. Expectations: Inspection Criteria, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS,
http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/about-our-inspections/inspectioncriteria/#.VOIORp3F98E (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
276. Id.
277. Id.

2015

It’s “Exhausting”

189

administrators are required to respond.278
A former warden
commented on the effectiveness of this oversight: “The process of
change and improvement . . . was greatly assisted by these . . .
independent reports because they were able draw public attention to
all the pressures which made it difficult to manage the prison
properly.”279 He concluded that “it took external inspections to get
[these issues] on the public agenda.”280
Other European countries implement monitoring standards largely
based on multilateral treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention
of Human Rights,281 the European Convention on Human Rights,282
and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment of Punishment.283 Forty-seven
European countries also implement the European Prison Rules,284 a
uniform set of standards focused on preventive and systemic
concerns in prison facilities. Additional oversight is conducted in
countries that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention
Against Torture (OPCAT), by the United Nations Subcommittee on
Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.285
The United States stands in stark contrast to the rest of the world in
its lack of prison oversight.286 The U.S. has not ratified OPCAT or
submitted itself to an entity for monitoring, nor does any federal or
state agency exist for this purpose.287 Prison administrators are selfselected, and, because of the PLRA, are insufficiently accountable for
violations in their institutions. A former Oklahoma prison warden
poignantly noted: “When we’re not held accountable, the culture
inside prisons becomes a place that is so foreign to the culture of the
278. See Gibbons & Katzenbach, supra note 274 at 80.
279. Andrew Coyle, Opening up a Closed World: The International Experience With
Prison Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2010).
280. Id.
281. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The United States has signed, but not yet ratified this
treaty.
282. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
283. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, E.T.S. No. 126.
284. Comm. of Ministers, Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules 2 (2006),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747.
285. See G.A. Res. 57/199 (Jan. 9, 2003).
286. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 38 (2001).
287. Id.
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real world that we develop our own way of doing things.”288 Glen
Fine, inspector general of the U.S. Department of Justice stated:
“There is tremendous pressure within an institution to keep quiet.”289
A former deputy assistant attorney general at the Department of
Justice remarked: “Broader issues regarding the safety of the prison,
the training of officers, and the adequacy of administrative processes
and overall conditions in the prison [often] go unaddressed.”290
In 2008, the American Bar Association revived Justice Brennan’s
concerns regarding the lack of oversight in the “shadow world” of
prisons,291 and passed a resolution “calling on [all levels of
government] to develop comprehensive plans to make the operations
of their correctional and detention facilities more transparent and
accountable to the public.”292 The resolution identified four primary
reasons for this proposal: (1) public awareness of “significant
problems” in prison will lead to safer and more constitutionally
conforming institutions “equipped to better prepare inmates for a
successful reentry into society[;]” (2) objective and independent
oversight will detect “potential problems that have been overlooked
at the facility[;]” (3) oversight can “be a cost-effective and proactive
means” to avoid lawsuits; and (4) “the factual findings of the
monitoring entity can substantiate the need” for additional funding
and resources.293 This resolution reinforces the role of federal courts
as venues of last resort, not the first line of defense for prisoners.
Ongoing and independent non-judicial oversight “could make outside
scrutiny of prisons and jails a comprehensive and ongoing process, in
contrast to the piecemeal and episodic review that results from
litigation.”294
Instead of the public learning of egregious violations once things
become so out of control,295 oversight and transparency can provide
288.
289.
290.
291.

292.
293.
294.
295.

Gibbons & Katzenbach, supra note 274, at 79.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates 2 (2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_ne
wsletter/crimjust_policy_am08104b.authcheckdam.pdf.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Fathi, supra note 261, at 1461.
In 2009, for example, the Black Guerilla Family gang was exposed as operating a
drug-trafficking and money laundering scheme from inside Maryland state prisons.
The illegal activity went unchecked for years, and involved dozens of prison officials
who were complicit in the conspiracy. Ann E. Marimow & John Wagner, 13
Corrections Officers Indicted in Md., Accused of Aiding Gang’s Drug Scheme, WASH.
POST (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/thirteen-correctional-
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an ongoing glimpse into the daily operations of prisons. This will not
only increase public awareness, but will also have a deterrent effect.
Prison officials, knowing that their actions and non-action will be
publicly scrutinized, will have an incentive to operate their facilities
in substantial compliance with the law. We have the EPA to monitor
pollution and the FDA to monitor consumer safety. These agencies
operate across all industries and sectors to proactively prevent bad
behavior.296 We should dedicate equal resources to the treatment of
human beings as we do to these other important causes.
CONCLUSION
Prisoners lose many rights upon incarceration, but fundamental
human rights are not among them. The closed nature of prisons and
the inability of prisoners to advocate on their own behalf for
institutional reform leads to mistreatment and abuse.297 The PLRA
severely limits a prisoner’s ability to obtain meaningful redress for
constitutional violations. The goals of the PLRA—to reduce frivolity
and improve the quality of prisoner suits—can be accomplished
through less restrictive means, without amending or repealing the
legislation. Addressing the conflict of interests in the current
administrative remedy procedure will foster greater trust in the
system. Recognizing exceptions to the proper exhaustion rule will
allow meritorious claims to proceed, and remove the incentive for
prison officials to summarily dismiss them. Ongoing oversight and
monitoring will promote accountability and lead to safer and more
humane institutions. It is time to expose the “hidden world of
punishment,” and to end the “rationing of justice” in American
prisons.
EPILOGUE
Shortly after the completion of this Comment, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued what should become a
officers-indicted-in-maryland/2013/04/23/6d2cbc14-ac23-11e2-a8b92a63d75b5459_story.html?Post+generic=%3Ftid%3Dsm_twitter_washingtonpost.
296. See Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Nov. 13,
2015); What We Do, FED. DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
default.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
297. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 103, 111 (1983) (asserting that
prisoners are “one of the classes of persons most in need” of Fourteenth Amendment
protections because “in the closed world of a prison, . . . prisoners are very likely to be
subjected to illegitimate administrative action”).
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landmark opinion with respect to prisoner litigation, that both
supports and validates the analysis and recommendations set forth
herein. Blake v. Ross,298 a case that exemplifies many of the
procedurally defaulted cases since Woodford’s “proper exhaustion”
requirement, presented the appellate court with an opportunity to
interpret a meaningful exception to the rigid “proper exhaustion”
rule.
On June 21, 2007, Michael Ross and James Madigan, lieutenants
with the Maryland Division of Correction (MDOC), moved Shaidon
Blake, a prisoner committed to the MDOC, from his cell to another
cell block.299 The officers retrieved Blake from his cell, and
handcuffed Blake’s hands behind his back.300 As the three men
proceeded to Blake’s new cell block, Madigan verbally harassed and
physically shoved Blake multiple times.301 The three men reached
the door to the new cellblock when Madigan ordered Blake to stand
against the wall.302 “With Ross still holding Blake against the wall,
Madigan wrapped a key ring around his fingers and then punched
Blake at least four times in the face in quick succession. Madigan
paused briefly, then punched Blake in the face again.”303 Madigan
and Ross then took Blake to the ground and restrained him until
backup arrived.304 As a result of this attack, Blake suffered numerous
injuries, including permanent nerve damage.305
Later that day, Blake filed a written report with senior corrections
officers.306 The Internal Investigative Unit (IIU), the prison’s own
investigative unit, conducted a yearlong investigation of the incident
and issued a formal report, concluding that Madigan indeed “used
excessive force against Blake by striking him in the face while he
was handcuffed.”307 This report prompted the MDOC to issue
Madigan an Unsatisfactory Report of Service and relieve him of his
duties.308

298. 787 F.3d 693, 697 (4th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3132, (U.S.
Sept. 17, 2015) (No. 15-339).
299. Id. at 695.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 696.
308. Id. at 698–99.
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On September 8, 2009, Blake filed a Section 1983 claim against
Ross and Madigan.309 Ross raised the affirmative defense of failure
to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies.310
Madigan, however, did not raise this defense, and Blake ultimately
prevailed against Madigan at trial.311 Regarding Blake’s claim
against Ross, the District Court granted Ross summary judgment
finding that Blake failed to properly exhaust his administrative
remedies.312 Blake appealed the court’s ruling, presenting the
following question on appeal: Whether Blake satisfied the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement by complying with the IIU investigation?313
It is undisputed that Blake never filed a grievance through the
internal administrative remedy procedure as required by MDOC
regulations.314 Blake argued that IIU’s investigation of this incident
removed his grievance from the administrative process
requirements.315 The court then methodically laid the foundation for
interpreting an administrative exception to the doctrine of “proper
exhaustion.”
First, the court recognized the primary purposes of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement: (1) to give prisons a chance to internally
address complaints; (2) to reduce litigation; and (3) to improve the
quality of the litigation.316 The exhaustion requirement, the court
noted, is not absolute.317
Second, the court recognized Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Woodford, which discussed “well-established exceptions” to the
“proper exhaustion” requirement, and the Second Circuit’s decision
in Giano v. Goord,318 applying such an exception.319

309. Id. at 696. Blake also named various institutional defendants and state entities, but
those parties were dismissed from the action for reasons unrelated to compliance with
the PLRA. Id.
310. Id. Ross failed to raise this defense in his initial answer. It was not until August 2,
2011, two years after Ross filed his answer, and after receiving consent from Blake’s
counsel to amend the answer, that this defense was raised. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 697. As is the case in every prison across the country, to properly preserve a
claim, a prisoner must file a grievance through the established internal administrative
remedy process. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 697–98.
317. Id. at 698, see also supra note 244.
318. Blake, 787 F.3d at 698 (citing Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Importantly, Giano was decided before Woodford, and although not expressly
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Third, the court adopted the Second Circuit’s two-pronged analysis
regarding the availability of an administrative exception to the
exhaustion requirement.320 This inquiry first examines whether the
prisoner procedurally exhausted his remedies—was the prisoner
“justified in believing” that his efforts in exhausting his claim were
satisfactory because the prison’s system was too confusing?321 The
inquiry then assesses the substantive aspect of the prisoner’s
exhaustion attempt—did the prisoner’s actual complaint exhaust his
remedies “in a substantive sense” by allowing the prison to resolve
the matter internally?322 The Fourth Circuit accepted this formulation
as striking “the appropriate balance between statutory purpose and
our administrative jurisprudence.”323
Regarding the procedural prong, the court found that the rules were
sufficiently vague to justify (or at least not contradict) Blake’s belief
that by reporting the incident to prison administrators, and by IIU
conducting an investigation, Blake had properly exhausted his
administrative remedies in a procedural sense.324
Substantively, the court found that Blake “clearly” satisfied the
exhaustion requirements because the MDOC conducted a yearlong
investigation and ultimately fired Madigan.325 The court held that the
MDOC had notice of the complaint, and a chance to develop an
“extensive record” and resolve the dispute internally without a need
for litigation, thus satisfying the primary purposes of the exhaustion
requirement.326
The court ultimately concluded that “Blake reasonably interpreted
Maryland’s murky inmate grievance procedures, and the IIU
investigation into his complaint provided the Department with ample
notice and opportunity to address internally the issues raised.”327
The balance recognized by the Fourth Circuit—ensuring that a pro
se prisoner litigant will not be penalized for making a good faith, but

319.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

overruled by that decision, its viability to coexist following Woodford was
questionable. Id.
Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued the Giano opinion on the same day as
Hemphill. See supra note 254 (discussing Hemphill). Both cases predate Woodford,
and both incorporate the notion that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not
absolute.
Blake, 787 F.3d at 698.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 698–99.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 701.
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flawed, attempt at administrative compliance, with preserving a
prison from unnecessary and unexpected litigation—mimics this
Comment’s suggestions in Part IV.328
The Blake decision not only embodies Justice Breyer’s conception
of a judicially crafted administrative exception to “proper
exhaustion;” it demonstrates that such an option is viable in its
application, and suitable in the pursuit of justice.
The Fourth Circuit is the first federal appellate court to adopt the
Hemphill framework,329 as further articulated in Giano,330 thereby
interpreting an administrative exception to the “proper exhaustion”
rule. This is significant for many reasons. Most importantly, Blake
creates strong precedent for the application of this exception by
federal courts on a case by case basis. This adapted methodology of
determining “proper exhaustion” will ensure that prisoners with
legitimate complaints will have those matters decided on the merits,
rather than summarily dismissed for procedural reasons. If a claim is
procedurally defaulted and the prisoner can demonstrate that the
Hemphill/Giano/Blake guidelines were satisfied, a federal court now
has precedent (and a diagramed framework) to apply an exception to
“proper exhaustion.”
Blake also supports the notion, as suggested by this Comment, that
“proper exhaustion” and meaningful redress for constitutional
violations can indeed coexist without requiring a full repeal of the
PLRA. Blake should lead the way for a federal movement toward a
more pragmatic and fact-based approach to individual prisoner
claims, ensuring that these claims are decided on their merits. Blake
represents an important paradigm shift in the way that federal courts
approach prisoner litigation and apply the PLRA’s requirements, and
should further help pierce the “iron curtain” that has been redrawn
between prisoners and their ability to vindicate constitutional
violations.

328. See supra Part IV.
329. See supra notes 253–59 and accompanying text.
330. Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 675–76 (2d Cir. 2004).
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